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Abstract We investigate the incremental interpretation of comparative and su-
perlative numeral modifiers by manipulating the speaker’s epistemic state in an
eye-tracking reading experiment. The results reveal a different processing profile for
two types of numeral modifiers. We take this difference to point to a difference in the
source and nature of the attested effects (e.g., Quantity- vs. Manner-based pragmatic
reasoning). Our findings inform the existing theoretical landscape, invalidating a
number of accounts of speaker ignorance effects with numeral modifiers and giving
support to Quantity-based accounts of such effects with superlative modifiers.
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1 Introduction
For a long time in the literature on modified numerals, theorists were concerned
with the contrast illustrated in (1). They have been arguing that infelicity arises in
(1b), and not in (1a), because at least as opposed to more than signals uncertainty
or ignorance on the part of the speaker, which clashes with the speaker competence
and knowledgeability conveyed by the continuation sentence. As a consequence, the
assumption that comparative modifiers do not give rise to speaker ignorance effects
was beyond question by a large number of studies (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Büring
2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Nouwen 2010; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b;
Kennedy 2015).
(1) a. Olga drank more than three margaritas. In fact, she drank five.
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b. Olga drank at least four margaritas. # In fact, she drank five.
This contrast between comparative and superlative numeral modifiers is also mani-
fested in various offline experiments probing speaker ignorance effects using stimuli
comparable to (1), but different methodologies (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Cummins
& Katsos 2010; Geurts, Katsos, Cummins, Moons & Noordman 2010; Coppock
& Brochhagen 2013a). Although there were already hints implicit in a few earlier
theoretical studies (e.g., Fox & Hackl 2006; Mayr 2013), only recently studies have
explicitly argued that comparative modifiers, too, can give rise to speaker ignorance,
once we shift our attention away from a paradigm similar to that in (1) and consider
what an utterance with a numeral modifier can be an answer to (Mayr & Meyer
2014; Westera & Brasoveanu 2014; Ciardelli, Coppock & Roelofsen 2017). More
specifically, these studies observe that when an utterance with a comparative modifier
is used as an answer to a how many question, see (2), it signals speaker ignorance.
The idea is that a how many question asks for a precise answer and answering with
more than implies that the speaker is unable to give the precise answer she is asked
for, hence she must be ignorant about the precise quantity under discussion.
(2) A: How many margaritas did Olga drink yesterday?
B: She drank more than three margaritas.
Interestingly, there is no complete consensus among the aforementioned authors as
to the status and strength of speaker ignorance implications of comparative mod-
ifiers. Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) argue that B’s utterance in (2) gives rise to
speaker ignorance to the same extent as its superlative counterpart, while Ciardelli
et al. (2017) claim that superlative modifiers trigger more robust speaker ignorance
implications than comparative modifiers.
Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) ran two experiments, each combining a validity
judgement task that targets ignorance interpretations and a self-paced reading task
in order to look into the incremental interpretation of utterances with comparative
and superlative modifiers. They do find that both numeral modifiers trigger speaker
ignorance when they are used as an answer to a how many question as opposed to
other types of questions. However, while their first offline task shows a difference
between the two numeral modifiers in ignorance ratings with respect to the how many
question, this difference does not reach significance in the second offline task. The
picture is similar in their online experiments. The first online task reveals interesting
effects, which could possibly be connected to the offline data obtained in the first of-
fline task. These effects, though, are not replicated by the second online experiment,
which has a better-defined design. Therefore, although Westera & Brasoveanu’s
(2014) offline experiments do show that more than triggers ignorance implications
with a how many question as opposed to other types of questions under discussion,
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their online experimental investigation delivers overall inconclusive results.
We maintain that looking into the incremental interpretation of comparative and
superlative numeral modifiers can shed interesting light on the differences and simi-
larities of comparative and superlative modifiers as to speaker ignorance implications
and their strength. In the present paper, we directly probe ignorance effects and the
time course thereof with a different design from Westera & Brasoveanu’s (2014),
measuring what happens in real time when interpreting a superlative or a comparative
modified numeral in a context with a how many question under discussion and where
the information state of the speaker is manipulated (knowledgeable vs. ignorant).
We do so by means of an eye-tracking reading experiment aiming to obtain insight
into the status of ignorance effects of comparative and of superlative modifiers. The
results directly inform the theoretical accounts and the relevant debate.
The next section (section 2) presents our study in detail and section 3 concludes.
2 Current study
The current study was conducted in Dutch and consists of two acceptability ques-
tionnaires and an eye-tracking reading experiment.
2.1 Design
In order to directly examine and access speaker ignorance effects of at least and
more than in incremental interpretation, we manipulated the speaker’s information
state. That is, we manipulated:
(i) the numeral modifier in the target sentence (NM manipulation): meer dan
‘more than’ vs. minstens ‘at least’,
(ii) the speaker’s epistemic state as set up by the context before the target sen-
tence with the numeral modifier (Context manipulation): speaker ignorance
vs. speaker authority context (cf. McNabb & Penka’s (2015) similar manip-
ulation in their second experiment). There was also a third Context condition
(speaker indifference context), which we will not be concerned with in the
present paper.
Thus, the NM and Context factors were manipulated in a 2×3 design. Below we
give an example of a test item in all relevant conditions. The texts consisted of an
intro followed by the context sentence with the Context manipulation, which was in
turn followed by the target sentence with the NM manipulation; some of the texts
would end with an outro.
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(3) Example item
Intro
Wesley heeft zijn eigen zaak waar hij met veel plezier tatoeages zet. Het is
er meestal erg druk en hij probeert elke dag acht mensen te tatoeëren. Deze
donderdag was hij ook weer hard aan het werk.
‘Wesley runs his own tattoo parlor, which he enjoys a lot. It’s usually very
busy and he tries to tattoo eight customers per day. Last Thursday, he was
very busy.’
Context sentence
a. Speaker ignorance context
Ik weet niet precies hoe het met de drukte zat, maar ik heb wel een idee.
‘I don’t know exactly how busy it got, but I have got an impression.’
b. Speaker authority context
Ik weet precies hoe het met de drukte zat en daarom zal ik je erover
vertellen.
‘I know exactly how busy it got, and I’ll tell you about it.’
Target sentence
Wesley
Wesley
heeft
has
die
that
dag
day
meer dan / minstens
more than / at least
tien
ten
mensen
people
met
with
veel
much
oog
eye
voor
for
detail
detail
getatoeëerd.
tattooed.
‘That day, Wesley tattooed more than/at least ten people with a real eye for
detail.’
As is also evident in the example item, the speaker ignorance contexts provide a
cue for drawing an ignorance implicature, while authority speaker contexts do not
provide a cue to any particular inference and merely convey that the speaker is
knowledgeable. In the latter case, the context sentence is compatible with the core
meaning of both numeral modifiers, i.e., with the number in question being ≥ 10
for the at least condition and ≥ 11 for the more than condition of the example item
above. This context setup is similar in spirit to that used by Breheny, Katsos &
Williams (2006), and Bergen & Grodner (2012) (see also Politzer-Ahles & Fiorentino
2013, a.o.). To illustrate with Breheny et al.’s (2006) study, they aimed to directly
measure what happens in real time when people interpret a scalar expression in two
different types of context: i.e., contexts that bias comprehenders toward drawing the
relevant scalar implicature versus contexts that do not have such a bias, but are rather
merely compatible with the basic, lower-bound meaning of the scalar expression.
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They did so by means of a self-paced reading task and tested the Greek equivalents of
the scalar expressions or and some (in different experiments). Below we exemplify
with some, breaking down a translated example item from Breheny et al. (2006)
into the context part with the context manipulation and the target sentence (the
continuation sentence is omitted).
(4) Example item (adapted from Breheny et al. 2006)
Context with bias: Mary asked John whether he intended to host all of his
relatives in his tiny apartment. John replied that
Context without bias: Mary was surprised to see John cleaning his apart-
ment and she asked the reason why. John told her that
Target sentence: he intended to host some of his relatives.
The context with bias provides a cue for drawing the not all scalar implicature,
while no such cue is provided by the context without bias, hence fewer or no im-
plicatures are expected to arise in the latter condition compared to the former one.
By analogy, in our experiment a speaker ignorance implicature is expected to arise
in the target sentence in the ignorance contexts, which have an ignorance bias, while
no such implicature is expected in the authority contexts, because they do not have
any bias and they are even contradictory with ignorance.
One could argue that speaker ignorance is entailed by the specific ignorance
context and that this together with the core meaning of the numeral modifiers is
sufficient for an ignorance interpretation of the target sentence, hence no implicature
is necessary to be generated in the target sentence. However, there is experimental
evidence by Mendia (2016) showing that the speaker ignorance implicature triggered
by at least is not just the reading the speaker lacks any beliefs about numbers in a
certain range, say, the range [10, ...) for the example item, but rather the stronger
reading that the speaker considers it possible that the number under discussion
is equal to 10 and she considers it possible that it is greater than 10. Contrary
to the former reading, the latter is not entailed and, thus, it has to be derived by
pragmatic means. Although there is no similar finding for the type of the ignorance
implicature more than is associated with, there is evidence that, in contrast to the
rest of the values, the minimum value of the relevant range (11 in the example item)
is a necessary alternative fed into the pragmatic mechanism more than involves (see
Alexandropoulou, Dotlacˇil, McNabb & Nouwen 2015 on variation/scalar implica-
tures of modified numerals). Glossing over the (derivation) details, this would result
in the stronger reading given above for at least’s speaker ignorance.
Lastly, our texts were constructed in such a way so as to implicitly introduce a
certain quantity under discussion.
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2.2 Predictions
2.2.1 Predictions of theoretical accounts
The theoretical accounts that derive speaker ignorance only with at least and not
with more than (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008; Nouwen 2010; Coppock &
Brochhagen 2013b; Kennedy 2015) would predict a difference between comparative
items and superlative items; especially those accounts deriving obligatory ignorance
with unembedded occurrences of at least (i.e., Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Nouwen
2010; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b). While the target sentence with more than
is semantically compatible both with a speaker ignorance and a speaker authority
context, this is not the case for the superlative condition. The core meaning of at
least is compatible with the ignorance and the authority context, but its obligatory
ignorance implication—be it an entailment or an implicature—is compatible with
the ignorance context, but clashes with the speaker authority context. Thus, these
accounts predict incoherence to arise between the authority context sentence and the
target sentence with at least. No such incoherence is predicted by Büring’s (2008)
or Kennedy’s (2015) Quantity-based account of ignorance, as they do not derive
obligatory ignorance effects with at least, so given our context setup ignorance is
expected to arise only in the ignorance context sentence.
According to Westera & Brasoveanu (2014), speaker ignorance implications
should arise to the same extent in the target sentence with more than and the target
sentence with at least when following an ignorance context sentence as opposed to an
authority context sentence. This is expected because in our contexts there is always
a certain (precise) quantity under discussion, which corresponds to the how many
question under discussion that Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) take as the right context
for triggering homogeneous ignorance implications with superlative and comparative
numeral modifiers. Recall that this homogeneity was only confirmed by the findings
of their second offline experiment, as their first experiment showed higher ignorance
ratings in the superlative than in the comparative condition when there was a(n
explicit) how many question under discussion. As ignorance implications are argued
to be context-sensitive on this account, no ignorance is expected to arise in the target
sentence in the authority context condition, where the context sentence directly
contradicts speaker ignorance.
Ciardelli et al. (2017) derive speaker ignorance implicatures both with superlative
and comparative numeral modifiers with a how many question under discussion, but
argue that the implicatures are stronger with superlative modifiers as compared to
comparative modifiers in such a context. Specifically, they derive them as a type
of a Quality implicature for superlatives and as a standard Quantity implicature for
comparatives, basing their difference in strength on the assumption that observing
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a Quality maxim is more urgent than observing a Quantity maxim. Thus, given
our context setup (with a certain quantity being discussed), speaker ignorance
implicatures are expected to arise in the target sentence in both NM conditions in
the ignorance condition, but will be of a more robust nature with minstens than with
meer dan due to their different source. Moreover, the ignorance implicatures with
superlatives are taken to be obligatory because they are tied to a certain Quality
maxim by virtue of the particular semantics of superlative modifiers on this account
and this maxim roughly requires that the speaker entertains multiple possibilities in
her information state with respect to the quantity under discussion. This means that
the target sentence with minstens will be incompatible with the authority context
sentences, because those reveal a totally knowledgeable speaker with respect to the
quantity under consideration.
2.2.2 Processing predictions
There are no explicit predictions as far as the processing of numeral modifiers and
their incremental interpretation are concerned. The vast majority of the existing
accounts, including the aforementioned ones, consist in theoretical proposals with
no direct processing implications. Nonetheless, there exist a few proposals incorpo-
rating a part that relates to processing, capturing the difference between superlative
and comparative modifiers. Cummins & Katsos (2010), for example, claim that
superlative modifiers are more difficult to process at a psychological level (Cummins
& Katsos 2010: 279) compared to comparative modifiers, because the former have a
disjunctive meaning (e.g., = n or > n for at least n), which is psychologically more
complex than either of the disjuncts. Geurts et al. (2010) too, who embrace Geurts
& Nouwen’s (2007) modal account of superlative modifiers, maintain that because
of their modal semantics superlative modifiers are harder to process compared to
comparatives, which do not have such a semantics.
Geurts et al. (2010) justify their processing statement by means of the findings
of an online verification task, where participants have to indicate whether a sentence
with a numeral modifier (superlative/comparative/exactly) is true of a situation where
up to four identical X’s were presented on a screen. Superlative modifiers as opposed
to comparative modifiers (or the baseline exactly condition) were found to delay
verification judgements of the relevant sentences, though no difference was found
in the (total) reading times of those sentences. Although the authors conclude that
their findings show that superlative modifiers are (semantically) more complex,
we can draw no firm conclusion with respect to their online interpretation. That
is, one cannot be sure what the delay in decision times should be associated with,
especially given that this does not manifest itself in the reported reading times of
the relevant sentences. Thus, it is very unclear why the modal interpretation of
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superlative modifiers would only occur in the decision times affecting them.
Cummins & Katsos (2010) make a similar point and in order to justify their
own processing assumption they conduct a similar experiment making the following
modifications: they replace the numeral modifiers (exactly, more than, less than,
at least, at most) with comparison operators (=,>,<,≥,≤), where the latter two
operators are disjunctive consisting of the simpler operators (=,>, and =,<, re-
spectively). They find the same results as Geurts et al.: the disjunctive operators
delay the decision procedure compared to the respective simple operators, similarly
to superlative modifiers in Geurts et al. 2010 as compared to the comparative and
exactly conditions. Cummins and Katsos conclude that the observed effect has
nothing to do with the supposed lexical modality of superlative modifiers, but it
should rather be due to their disjunctive interpretation, which they do share with
the operators ≥ and ≤. However, we should be cautious with such a conclusion.
The mean decision times for the disjunctive conditions in Cummins & Katsos 2010
(≥: 1110ms, ≤: 1131ms) are way shorter than the corresponding superlative condi-
tions in Geurts et al. 2010 (at least: 1559ms, at most: 1982ms), while the difference
between the = and exactly baseline conditions is not that big (982ms and 1114ms,
respectively). Even if we assume that (part of) the difference is due to Geurts et al.’s
(2010) participants converting the linguistic expressions to the mathematical ex-
pressions or just due to processing spillover because of the length difference, still
it seems that a bigger complexity is possibly associated with superlative modifiers
compared to the mathematical operators. All in all, we infer that although the two
accounts in question include a processing profile on top of their theoretical one, the
(real-time) processing evidence reported lend them very little support.
Neither can Westera & Brasoveanu’s (2014) findings be used in favor of the
processing proposal of the accounts in question. In their first self-paced reading task,
Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) find that participants slow down when reading the
region of the numeral that is being modified and at subsequent regions, but they do
not find a difference between superlative and comparative modifiers, as Cummins
& Katsos (2010) and Geurts et al. (2010) would predict. They only find such a
difference (at the expense of the superlative condition) five regions after the numeral
modifier. Westera & Brasoveanu (2014), on the other hand, take their effects to be
due to the costly on-line calculation of speaker ignorance inferences via pragmatic
reasoning or possible silent intonational effects during reading. However, as we
mentioned above, in a second similar experiment Westera and Brasoveanu failed
to replicate what they found about the incremental interpretation of sentences with
numeral modifiers. To conclude, the little processing predictions available in the
literature of numeral modifiers seem to be disfavored by any existing conclusive
experimental evidence.
Despite the absence of a concrete processing profile for superlative modifiers in
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the literature (due to the limited availability of successful predictions and definitive
empirical evidence), we can inherit some processing predictions from a previous
experiment we carried out (see Alexandropoulou 2018)1, which was very similar to
the present one. In that experiment, we set out to investigate from scratch the time
course (i) of interpreting the superlative modifier at least (in Dutch) in a similarly
manipulated context, and (ii) of accessing speaker ignorance inferences. Crucially,
we maintained a neutral approach to the processing of the superlative modifier. That
is to say, we considered all possible processing implications that the predictions of
the theoretical accounts we discussed in section 2.2.1 could have. We considered
both the possibility that the online interpretation (of a felicitous occurrence) of the
modified numeral may be associated with a processing difficulty and the possibility
that it may be rapidly generated. We furthermore considered the possibility that
incompatibility of a speaker ignorance interpretation with the context, as predicted
by a number of accounts (e.g., Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Nouwen 2010; Coppock
& Brochhagen 2013b; Ciardelli et al. 2017) for the use of unembedded at least in
authority contexts, may (or may not) disrupt reading. We found that readers were
more likely to re-read the numeral phrase, which followed the superlative modifier
and where the interpretation of the whole modified numeral is completed, when they
were in an ignorance as opposed to an authority context. We took this finding to
indicate that the online interpretation of an at least modified numeral is associated
with a processing cost and that readers return to the region in question in order to
derive the ignorance implicature the speaker considers it possible that exactly ten
people were tattooed by Wesley and she considers it possible that Wesley tattooed
more than ten people, here given for the superlative condition of the target sentence
in (3). We further concluded that our findings are in favor of the Quantity-based
accounts such as Büring 2008, Kennedy 2015, and Schwarz 2016, which derive this
type of speaker ignorance.
Taking into account our previous findings and the theoretical predictions we dis-
cussed in section 2.2.1, let us now consider in detail what the processing predictions
for the present experiment could be. According to the theoretical accounts that derive
speaker ignorance only with superlative and not with comparative modifiers (Geurts
& Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Nouwen 2010; Coppock &
Brochhagen 2013b; Kennedy 2015), we would predict a different processing profile
for the two numeral modifiers. Specifically, Büring (2008) and Kennedy (2015), who
derive speaker ignorance as a Quantity implicature, predict a replication of the effect
of our previous experiment for at least, manifested itself as a difference between
authority items and ignorance items in the superlative condition. Cummins & Katsos
(2010), who take superlative modifiers to be psychologically more complex because
1 Our previous experiment has also been reported in a paper that appeared in SALT 26 proceedings as
Alexandropoulou, Dotlacˇil & Nouwen (2016).
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of their disjunctive status, predict a processing penalty for superlative items at the
modified numeral phrase across Context conditions. Geurts & Nouwen (2007), who
take ignorance to follow from the lexical semantics of superlative modifiers, predict a
contradiction of at least-target sentences with the authority context sentences, which
is expected to disrupt comprehension and cause a processing difficulty (interaction
of authority and superlative). The same is expected given Nouwen (2010), who
derives speaker ignorance via the combinatorics of a last-resort insertion of a silent
existential modal with an unembedded at least. Perhaps a smaller disruption is
expected if his last-resort strategy is assumed to incur some extra processing cost.
Next, Coppock & Brochhagen (2013b), who derive an obligatory type of speaker
ignorance via a certain Quality maxim (similar to that assumed by Ciardelli et al.
2017), predict an ignorance implicature to arise across Context conditions. So this is
expected to induce a processing penalty given our previous finding, which might be
bigger in the authority condition, because there the Quality maxim is violated, as it
requires that the speaker considers multiple epistemic possibilities.
Lastly, while Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) predict a similar processing profile
for the superlative and the comparative modifier, and thus an effect as in our previous
experiment (no interaction), Ciardelli et al. (2017) make different predictions for the
two modifiers given the how many question under discussion. In fact, their predic-
tions are very similar to those by Coppock & Brochhagen (2013b). The ignorance
implicature is more robust and obligatory with at least than with more than, hence
a larger effect is expected in the ignorance condition for at least (interaction of
superlative and ignorance). However, as such an implicature is obligatory and arises
in the authority condition too, which is not the case for more than, a violation of
the relevant Quality maxim will occur at the at least-modified numeral, possibly
resulting in a main effect of the superlative condition or in an even greater effect of
the superlative in the authority condition, if we assume that violating a fundamental
pragmatic maxim (i.e., Quality) is costlier than obeying it.
2.3 Questionnaires
We conducted an offline study in order to test the strength of the contexts in terms
of knowledgeability. More precisely, by means of a questionnaire we asked native
speakers of Dutch (N = 32) to judge the author’s (of the texts) knowledgeability
of the quantity being discussed. Participants were given 39 test items like that in
(3) (Latin square design) intermixed with 36 filler items (75 trials in total), with the
difference that the modified numeral in the target sentence was replaced with the
hash symbol (#), as in (5). They were said that # stands for a quantity and were next
asked to indicate how likely it is that the author knows the precise quantity. They had
to do so on a Likert scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for “highly unlikely” and 7 for
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“highly likely”. The author of the ignorance contexts was expected to receive low
likelihood ratings, below the middle value of the scale (i.e., 4), while the author of
the authority contexts was expected to be judged as being highly likely to know the
precise quantity. The filler items were completely different from the test items and
contained no specification as far as the author’s knowledgeability state is concerned.
(5) Example item: Target sentence
Wesley heeft die dag # mensen met veel oog voor detail getatoeëerd.
Wesley has that day # people with much eye for detail tattooed.
‘That day, Wesley tattooed # people with a real eye for detail.’
The author in the ignorance contexts was judged to be (highly) significantly less
likely to be knowledgeable of the precise quantity compared to the author in the
authority contexts (t =−9.022, p < .0001). Specifically, the latter condition scored
very close to the right end of the relevant scale (mean = 6.050), while the former
condition obtained a mean likelihood rating lower than the middle value of the Likert
scale (mean = 3.411), as expected. Therefore, our authority contexts are strong
knowledgeability contexts with respect to the precise quantity in question, while
ignorance contexts are poor(er) knowledgeability contexts.
Perhaps one would expect that the ignorance Context condition would get an
even lower mean score, however, the fact that the second half of the ignorance
context sentences would state that the author does have an impression or suspicion
or some thoughts with respect to the number in question possibly justifies the actual
mean score of that condition.
Importantly, before moving to the eye-tracking experiment, we would like to
point out that as in our previous study we also ran an offline experiment (N = 18)
that tested the compatibility of the target sentence (with the NM manipulation) with
the preceding authority/ignorance context, and we found the following: the authority
condition scored high on the 1-7 coherence scale, with mean = 5.509, while no
difference was found between the two NM conditions (meer dan: mean = 5.376,
minstens: mean = 5.641, p = .456). This already goes against those accounts that
predicted an incoherence for at least in the authority condition either due to a
contradiction (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Nouwen 2010) or due to the violation of
an inescapable pragmatic maxim (Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b; Ciardelli et al.
2017).
2.4 Eye-tracking reading experiment
2.4.1 Participants
Forty native speakers of Dutch participated in the eye-tracking experiment, who
were recruited from the UiL OTS participant database. The data of thirty-eight
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(4 male, mean age: 23.66, age range: 18–42) of them were further considered, as
two participants did not complete the experiment due to technical problems during
testing. All participants were paid for their participation in the experiment. Lastly,
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and were naive as to the
purpose of the study.
2.4.2 Materials
Of the 39 items included in the questionnaires, three were excluded from further
testing because of poor coherence between the relevant target sentences and the
preceding context sentences (low mean coherence ratings overall). Our test items
appeared in six conditions (3 Context × 2 NM). They were rotated through twelve
lists in a Latin square design and every list had six items per condition. Every
participant saw only one list with 112 trials in total: four practice trials, thirty-six test
trials, and seventy-two filler trials. The trials of every list were randomly ordered for
each participant. Fifty-two comprehension statements about the story narrated in
the texts were included too, to control for whether participants pay attention to the
texts they are reading. Participants had to indicate whether the statement was true
or false given the text they had just read. These comprehension statements targeted
information that was irrelevant to the manipulations of the experiment. Twenty-
one (out of the 36) experimental items were followed by such a comprehension
statement, while the remaining 31 comprehension statements were follow-ups of
the filler items. The target sentence in 22 of the experimental items was not the last
sentence of the text, but was followed by an outro sentence, such as He also has
two employees in his service that have learned the art of tattooing from him for the
example item in (3).
2.4.3 Procedure
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in a sound-treated booth and the
distance of their head to the screen was 55–70 cm. Their eye movements were
recorded with an EyeLink 1000 eye tracker in remote mode (using a target sticker),
sampling at 500Hz. The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch Acer AL1717 monitor
and a three-button button box was provided to participants for answering the com-
prehension questions or moving on.
Participants first read the instructions, where they were informed that they would
be presented with short stories, each consisting in a short paragraph. After the
story, a comprehension question about the text just presented would occasionally
appear, which they had to answer by using the button box (right button for YES and
left button for NO). Participants had to press the third, middle, button in order to
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Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 Region 9
Wesley has that day more than / at least ten people with a real eye for detail tattooed.
Table 1 Eye-tracking experiment: Regions of target sentence in (3).
progress. After reading the instructions, the calibration procedure with nine fixation
points would start. After a successful calibration, participants would move on to the
practice block, where they read four practice items and answered comprehension
questions that two of them were associated with. Then the experiment block began.
2.4.4 Results
Of the 38 participants one participant was excluded prior to analysis because she
answered 63% of the comprehension statements correctly, while the remaining 37
participants scored 77% or higher. The data of all 37 participants were included in
the statistical analyses. Data points of an item seen by 11 participants were excluded
because it contained a typo in the context sentence (.86% of the observations).
Another 1.12% of the overall observations was excluded because of problematic
trials (i.e., trials with few or no fixations due to track losses or participants’ sloppy
reading). For all measures, fixations of 0 ms were excluded from the analysis. We
log-transformed the remaining reading-time data to approximate normality.
We split the texts into regions for the purpose of the analyses. The intro (see (3))
constituted Region 1, while the speaker context was Region 2. The target sentence
was divided into individual regions as illustrated in Table 1 for the example item
in (3). The outro of the texts was excluded from the region partitioning, as not all
test items contained an outro sentence. For each of the regions we analyzed seven
eye-tracking measures: (i) first-pass time (sum of fixations in a region before exited
for the first time to any direction), (ii) right-bounded time (sum of fixations in a
region before exited for the first time to the right), (iii) regression path duration (sum
of fixations since first fixation in a region until it is exited to the right for the first
time), (iv) probability of regression (the probability of doing a first-pass regression
from a given region), (v) total reading time (sum of all fixation durations in a region),
(vi) re-reading time (sum of fixations in a region excl. first-pass fixations), and (vii)
probability of re-reading (the probability of entering a region more than once).
We conducted linear mixed-effects regression analyses on the log-transformed
reading-time data and mixed-effects logistic regression analyses on the categorical
regression probability and re-reading probability measures using the lme4 package
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker & Walker 2015) in R. All analyses included three predictor
variables, Context (authority / ignorance / indifference context), NM (more than vs.
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Figure 1 Probability of re-reading regions of the target sentence per condition.
at least) and their interaction. The variables were treatment-coded, with authority
and more than as baselines. The analyses also included random intercepts and slopes
for participants and items for all fixed effects. We applied backward model selection
for random effects (Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily 2013) and in the following we
will be presenting the output of the model with the maximal random-effect structure
that converged and had the best fit. P-values are calculated based on Satterthwaite’s
approximations using the ImerTest package of R.
No significant main effects or interaction of Context and NM factors on any mea-
sure were observed at Region 1 (Intro) up to Region 6 (more than/at least). A signif-
icant positive interaction was attested between the Context and NM factors at Region
7 (ten people) in re-reading probability (β = .601, SE = .299, z = 2.010, p < .05):
the difference between the ignorance and authority Context conditions was bigger in
the superlative than in the comparative condition, as illustrated by Figure 1. This
indicates that readers were more likely to re-read the critical region of the numeral
phrase in an ignorance context as opposed to an authority context in the superlative
condition than in the comparative condition.
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Figure 2 Re-reading times for regions of target sentence per condition.
Furthermore, as also manifested by Figure 1, the statistical analysis revealed a
significant negative effect of NM on the probability of re-reading in the same region
(Region 7: ten people), showing that readers were more likely to re-read that region
when it followed more than as opposed to at least in an authority context. A post-hoc
analysis for the separate modifiers showed that there was only an effect of Context in
the superlative condition (β = .442, SE = .215, z = 2.055, p < .05): the numeral
phrase of ignorance items was more likely to be re-read than that of authority items
when it was modified by at least. This constitutes a replication of the effect of our
first experiment (see Alexandropoulou 2018). No effect on any other measure was
found to be significant in Region 7, except for a marginal positive effect of Context
in re-reading times (β = .204, SE = .104, t = 1.958, p = .052).
In Region 8 (with a real eye for detail), which is a spillover region, following the
modified numeral phrase, there was a positive effect of Context (β = .272, SE =
.107, t = 2.551, p < .05) and a negative interaction of NM and Context factors
(β =−.456, SE = .180, t =−2.531, p < .05) on re-reading times. When readers
re-read the prepositional phrase in Region 8 (see how often they read it, compared to
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other regions of the target sentence, in Figure 1) they exhibit a slowdown if they are in
an ignorance context as opposed to an authority context and this slowdown is bigger
in comparative items than in superlative items (see Figure 2). No significant effect on
the other measures was found in Region 8, besides a marginally significant effect of
ignorance Context on regression path duration (β = .154, SE = .087, t = 1.760, p=
.083) and on total reading times (β = .110, SE = .058, t = 1.892, p= .063). These
effects suggest that readers tend to spend more time overall reading Region 8 of
comparative items, but also when first reading this region including possible fixations
to previous regions, in the ignorance condition rather than in the authority condition.
Finally, Region 9 (tattooed), the last region of the target sentence, exhibited only
a marginal interaction effect between NM and Context on re-reading probability
(β = .670, SE = .354, z = 1.890, p = .059), such that the probability of re-reading
that region in an ignorance context as compared to an authority context is higher
in the superlative than in the comparative condition. This difference is visible in
Figure 1 too. In the next section, we discuss the results of the present experiment
and evaluate the predictions presented in section 2.2.2 against all our results.
2.4.5 Discussion
As in our previous experiment (Alexandropoulou 2018), we find effects on the
probability of re-reading the critical Region 7 (ten people). The significant interaction
between Context and NM attested in this measure and region (also marginal in
Region 9), i.e., the difference between ignorance and authority items being greater
in the superlative condition than in the comparative one, goes against a number of
accounts. First, it goes against the semantic accounts of ignorance with superlative
modifiers that derive no ignorance with comparatives, such as Geurts & Nouwen
2007, according to which we predicted a disruptive effect in a critical region of the
modified numeral phrase in the authority condition of superlative items due to the
resulting contradiction. It is also at odds with Nouwen 2010, according to which a
similar contradiction, and thus disruptive effect, was predicted for superlative items
in the authority condition or a processing penalty for superlative items overall as
compared to comparative items, if we assume that Nouwen’s last-resort strategy
that is responsible for speaker ignorance is an effortful process. Recall that the
results of our compatibility pretest were also in conflict with the predictions of these
two accounts. Moreover, this interaction effect invalidates Westera & Brasoveanu’s
(2014) prediction of a similar processing profile between the comparative and the
superlative condition given our context setup. It could further be in favor of Coppock
& Brochhagen 2013b or Ciardelli et al. 2017, according to which we predicted a
difference between superlative and comparatives, as long as we assume that obeying
the respective Quality maxims that derive speaker ignorance is more demanding
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in terms of processing resources than violating those maxims, as is predicted for
superlative items in the authority condition. Note, however, that our compatibility
pretest revealed high coherence ratings for the target sentence with an authority
context sentence, regardless of the NM type, indicating that no contradiction relation
holds between the two sentences. The attested interaction seems to be in support of
Büring (2008) and Kennedy (2015), if we assume that the difference between the
comparative and the superlative condition is to be associated with something that
makes the latter modifiers more complex, such as the availability and derivation of
speaker ignorance implicatures via standard Quantity-based reasoning.
Furthermore, in the same measure and region, we also found a difference between
comparative and superlative items in the baseline authority context condition at
the expense of the former (negative effect of superlative condition). This again
is unexpected given accounts that derive obligatory and robust ignorance effects
with superlative modifiers and no or less robust ignorance effects with comparative
modifiers (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Nouwen 2010; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b;
Ciardelli et al. 2017), as, if anything, we would expect the relevant difference to be
in the opposite direction. But what could have caused this difference, given that
the meaning of a comparative target sentence and of a superlative target sentence is
equivalent in the authority condition? One could argue that the effect in question
could possibly be associated with the fact that, all else being equal, at least, but not
more than, states and does not exclude the minimum value exactly n of the relevant
range. This might seem more appropriate, since at least draws attention to a number
that would make the statement true, unlike more than.
Importantly, the fact that superlative items were found to be more likely to
be re-read in the ignorance condition than in the authority one, is a replication of
our finding in our previous experiment (Alexandropoulou 2018). It is also against
Cummins & Katsos (2010), who predicted that the superlative modifier will be
psychologically as complex and taxing in the two Context conditions. This finding is
further taken to reflect that readers revisit the region of ten people in order to derive
via an implicature the reading the speaker considers it possible that Wesley tattooed
exactly ten people and she considers it possible that he tattooed more than ten people,
which is not entailed by the context. Overall, our results so far are in accordance
with Büring’s (2008) and Kennedy’s (2015) Quantity-based accounts of speaker
ignorance effects of superlative modifiers, but against Cummins & Katsos (2010).
They are moreover against Geurts & Nouwen’s (2007), Nouwen’s (2010), Coppock
& Brochhagen’s (2013b), and Ciardelli et al.’s (2017) accounts that derive obligatory
and robust ignorance implications with at least as well as Westera & Brasoveanu
(2014) who predict a uniform behavior for comparatives and superlatives.
How could we explain, though, the effects in Region 8 (with a real eye for detail),
which come to confirm the different processing profile displayed by comparative and
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superlative modifiers? Readers slow down when re-reading Region 8 of comparative
items in the ignorance condition and tend to slow down in regression path and total
reading times, too. This is unexpected considering the predictions we put forth
given the existing accounts of modified numerals. Perhaps less so given Ciardelli
et al. (2017), if we assume that such a finding is possibly the signal of the online
derivation of a weaker or different speaker ignorance implication with more than as
compared to at least that kicks in late(r) during incremental interpretation. Another
explanation could be that these effects occurring after the critical regions (6 and
7) have been read reflect that comprehenders had an afterthought: “why did the
speaker not use ‘minstens’ (at least), which is a better cue to speaker ignorance?”.
Such a reasoning results in a Manner implicature, apparently interfering with online
processing. On this interpretation, the effect in question seems to be compatible with
the theories predicting no ignorance implication with comparative modifiers (Geurts
& Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Nouwen 2010; Coppock
& Brochhagen 2013b; Kennedy 2015).
3 Conclusion
We investigated the incremental interpretation of numeral modifiers by manipulating
the speaker’s epistemic state in an eye-tracking reading study. Our results revealed a
different processing profile for superlative and comparative modifiers: while a pro-
cessing penalty is detected at the numeral phrase following the superlative modifier
when used by an ignorant speaker (in late measures), a processing penalty occurs at
a later point of a sentence with a comparative modifier uttered by an ignorant speaker
(marginal in early and significant in late measures). We take our findings to suggest
that pragmatic reasoning is attested online: in the form of a non-obligatory Quantity-
based ignorance implicature with superlative modifiers, and possibly as a Manner
implicature or as an ignorance implicature of a different nature with comparative
modifiers.
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